This article uses a detailed examination on the 1948 In the eyes of his detractors, Harold Wilson was too clever by half. Wilson, the unexpected Labour leader who went on to win four General Elections, is often regarded as a master of political deception.
academic tongue, his opponents pointed to a preference for cigars and his critics hinted at a 'seamy private and business life'. 2 Wilson's legacy has been regarded as similarly illusory, with particular scorn reserved for the apparent failure to deliver on the widespread modernisation promised by his famous invocation of the 'white heat of the scientific revolution'. For David Edgerton, whose research has charted technological change throughout the twentieth century, this failure was all the more damming given that Britain had been the 'scientific and technological powerhouse of Western Europe' in 1960
and endured a relative decline during the Wilson years as his government grappled with its spending commitments. 3 Such accusations have been levelled from across the political spectrum: with those on the left as uneasy about his political manoeuvring as those on the right. Indeed, during the period of internal factionalism that preceded his ascent to party leadership, Wilson appeared obsessed with his career, ideologically ambivalent and politically opportunistic. All of which stood at odds with an ideasfocused tradition and -in the words of Timothy Heppell -'created an image of deviousness and disloyalty'. 4 Wilson's reputation and political legacy have recently undergone something of a resurgence.
In the years following his abrupt departure from public life, historians have tested his contemporaries' argued that the attention paid to growth and modernisation in the run up to 1964 should be regarded as more than simple rhetoric. 6 A more nuanced appraisal can even be detected within accounts that continue to present Wilsonism as something of an illusion. Steven Fielding, for example, analysing the 1964 election from a 'new political history' perspective, has argued that Wilson's strategy was more complicated than a simple 'catch all' revisionism. Instead, he maintains that it built upon foundations laid by Hugh Gaitskell and offered a relatively cautious programme that 'looked backwards almost more than it peered forwards'. 7 Such an approach explicitly sets out to challenge a high political orthodoxy. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that -even when approached from such a positionWilsonism is seen to have offered a degree of compromise whilst maintaining a distinctly 'socialist' agenda. press, was seized upon by the pugnacious Conservative MP John Boyd-Carpenter in a pamphlet that was designed to foster discussion amongst party activists. Accepting that evasion had become widespread, he pointed to the 'socially disastrous' consequences of a system that was out of line with public opinion. 'Children who see their parents break one law without shame', he noted, 'will be predisposed themselves to break others'. 49 For Churchill, speaking in the debate following Belcher's resignation, the moral of the story was clear, 'if you destroy a free market, you create a black one'.
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When viewed against this ideologically charged debate -one in which controls were used as a proxy for actions that could be described as either 'socialist', 'totalitarian' or 'immoral' -Wilson's pledge to remove every control apart from 'those which are essential' has often been interpreted as representing a definite shift in emphasis. Indeed, within a literature that has broadly accepted that physical controls were necessary 'building blocks' for economic planning, and which has tended to agree with Brooke that this was 'a notable … casualty' of the period, the Bonfires have been drawn into a network of network of conflicting arguments surrounding the extent to which their relaxation should be seen as a retreat for an administration committed to recreate Britain as a 'Socialist Commonwealth'. 51 Sitting alongside the picture later described by Zweiniger-Bargielowska, others, adamant that the subject was one that the public were 'only remotely interested' in. 63 Crucially, and notwithstanding their libertarian rhetoric, his fairly pessimistic view was shared by a despondent Conservative Party that conceded in early 1948 that its campaign against controls had so far failed because 'The wage-earner has little need to fill up forms for licences permits or passports'. 64 The key question for consideration, therefore, is that of how Wilson was able to translate a subject which bore so little relation to everyday lives into one of popular political debate.
-III-
This question is complicated by the fact that the Bonfires were little more than parliamentary updates.
Wilson made it clear that they were part of a 'policy which has been frequently stated' and each included numerous regulations that had already been removed. 65 Even the decision to bundle each announcement was not, in itself, entirely surprising given that the government had always intended to make a statement half way into the departmental investigations. 66 Yet the decision to quantify the Bonfire in terms of licence requests removed was far from rational. The claim was over 130 000 licences higher than the figure given by a letter of explanation sent to Sir Stafford Cripps, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and had not been included in the first draft of Wilson's speech. 67 Moreover, despite the apparent expansion of his scope, the estimated number of jobs that would be saved remained surprisingly low. The imprecise figure of 30-40 was, in fact, exactly the same as that given to a GOC meeting before the addition of the extra licences. 68 The apparent disparity led to questions from the Treasury; Bridges, who feared that it would be exposed by The Economist, referred to the issue as a potential scandal and demanded an explanation. 69 The reason soon became apparent.
In a personal letter from Woods, sent on 2 December, he was informed that the low manpower saving could be explained by the fact that the vast majority of the licences included were those covering the distribution of vacuum flasks. 70 This scheme was, as noted above, symbolic of the confusion inherent within the system. Even so, the decision to describe each individual request for a permit as a 'control' certainly exaggerated the announcement's importance. There was 'no doubt', Merriam admitted, ' [that] this bonfire had a better press that its actual content deserved'. 71 Wilson would have been well aware of this point. Indeed, Merriam's 'Half Term Report', which was presented at the beginning of September, had ominously noted that it would be almost impossible to distinguish between essential and inessential controls before the end of his investigation. 72 This outcome could have been anticipated from the very outset. The GOC had, in fact, explicitly called for the departmental Examiners to avoid the licensing system, which it described as being 'of minor importance', and focus their efforts on more important organisational and structural problems. 73 The Board of Trade's decision to ignore this advice left the investigation beset by internal uncertainties and the CC remained adamant 'that no one person fully comprehends the whole system'. 74 Wilson's approach to clothes rationing caused similar stirrings of unease. Indeed, following initial ration changes made during the late spring and summer of 1948, when some miscellaneous goods and all footwear was 'taken off the ration', Robert Hall, the director of the Economic Section, complained to Edwin Plowden, the Chief Planning Officer, that the decision had been taken without consultation and cast 'doubt [over] whether our talk of planning is a reality or not'. 75 Almost a year later, and just days before the second Bonfire was announced, similar fears were repeated by Douglas
Jay. There was, he carefully noted, a real risk that the Bonfires gave 'an impression of general relaxation' that stood at odds with the government's overall policy. 76 These fears were widely shared and even Merriam called for an 'alternative technique'. 77 It is clear, however, that the March announcement was deliberate and had gained support from the highest level. Indeed, that January, during a Cabinet discussion, Clement Attlee had called on his Ministerial team to ensure that they were able to get 'credit for a good story'. His comment was supported by Wilson, who endeavoured to do just that.
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The presentational devices adopted by Wilson -such as the symbolic tearing of his ration book -certainly stood in stark contrast to the more subdued line adopted by the other ministries. He had, in fact, been 'anxious to get ahead' from the outset and had hoped to include notices of decontrol in his departmental press conferences from January 1948. 79 Although this was not to be the case, the CC noted a year later that his 'spirit of incendiarism' had shown the Board of Trade to be 'thoroughly Bonfire minded'. 80 It all seemed to be something of a departure for a man who prided himself on being a professional economist and had been described as a 'brilliant young civil servant' in 1945. 81 Wilson's emergence as a political figure had been somewhat unavoidable; compared with wartime Whitehall, the Board of Trade was a very public responsibility and his position as the youngest Cabinet Minister of the twentieth century added a degree of interest. Yet it is clear that he had also taken care to cultivate his public image. His infamously technical speeches were, for instance, meticulously prepared so as to avoid repetition and his young family had even taken part in a filmed interview for British Pathé just weeks after he moved to the Board of Trade. 82 Wilson, it must be noted, was not a particularly natural performer in front of the camera. Even so, and despite ministers being warned off newsreel appearances by Herbert Morrison, the technique was adopted again in 1949 to announce the eventual abolition of the clothes rationing scheme. Conservative frontbencher Harold Macmillan summed up the mood when he made a joking wish for 'another by-election so that we can get some more meat'.
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Although Labour held both seats, the exact relationship between each announcement and broader public opinion is impossible to gauge. Taken together, the Bonfires did coincide with a growing optimism about the national economy and a broader swing in support for the government that saw satisfaction ratings reach a twelve month high in March 1949. 90 However, despite helping to foster a narrative of normalisation, many controls were only removed because rising prices and a lack of disposable income had led to a slackening of domestic demand. This was especially true of clothing.
The scheme, which was the only to have a direct impact on the consumer, had been gradually undermined by rising prices and a lack of disposable income with the existence of significant gluts an open secret shared by many in trade. 91 The situation was such that, by January 1949, over 70 per cent of respondents to the Government's Social Survey believed themselves to be constrained by cash and not coupons. 92 The decision to finally abolish the scheme -described as being part of 'a great experiment' -was only taken once an Advisory Council made up of representatives from the trade and consumer groups was clear that consumption levels would not increase. 99 By capitalising upon the same ambiguity that had allowed the Conservatives to link controls with freedom, Wilson had successfully conjured an illusion of change that was used to highlight their complete absence' of an alternative policy. 100 It was a deft move.
-IV- [they] will affect them and their families'. 113 The public, he explained, tended to vote as consumers and there was 'every danger that once again many electors will vote against us'. 114 Skilfully drawing upon the very context that had allowed his Bonfires to appear significant whilst promoting a policy that remained avowedly 'socialist' -and, within which, certain controls continued to play an important role -Wilson had matched political style with political philosophy.
-V-
It is clear that the ambiguity surrounding the controls system and Labour's vision of democratic planning presented a number of opportunities. This article has shown how Wilson was able to actively exploit this confusion in order to remove a central facet of the Conservative Party's appeal during a period of intense party political competition. Nevertheless, there were limits to his actions and any plaudits were relatively short-lived. Indeed, only two days after the first blaze was lit, the Daily Mail claimed that the Bonfires were being used as a smokescreen to placate voters whilst Labour sought to impose its doctrinaire vision of socialism; Britain, it declared, would 'get lollipops -but lose liberty'. 115 As Bridges feared, its scale also drew a number of questions with The Economist satirically noting that 'it ought not to have needed an official examiner to find out that the permit scheme for 28 essays and articles that no one was likely to read. 121 The Bonfires may not have signified the death of a modernising 'professional economist', but they did herald the birth of a politician. As such, they provide an insight into a high level understanding of popular politics during the immediate post war and the complex relationship between this and public opinion more broadly defined. They were, in short, symbolic of a nascent Wilsonism and suggest the need for a historical approach that pays attention to both aspects thereof.
